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COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS AND STATUTORY PRE-
SUMPTIONS - SELF-INCRIMINATION AND MARIHUANA REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS. - Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
O N December 22, 1965, Timothy F. Leary's attempt to enter
Mexico was denied.' While returning to the United States, he
was stopped and inspected at the American secondary inspection area
and was found to have marihuana in his possession. He was sub-
sequently convicted2 of knowingly transporting marihuana into the
United States" and of knowingly transporting marihuana without
having paid the transfer tax.' On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reversed on the basis that a presumptive provision of the
importation statute was not "rationally connected" with the facts
of the case and was thus a denial of due process.' Also, the Court
concluded that the Marihuana Tax Act 7 contained a " 'real and ap-
preciable' hazard of incrimination"' resulting in a denial of Leary's
fifth amendment privilege.'
1 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Dr. Leary drove across the International
Bridge where he was stopped by the Mexican authorities and after apparently being
denied entry, he returned across the bridge to the United States.
2 United States v. Leary, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rehearing denied, 392 F.2d
220 (1968).
321 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964) provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whoever, knowingly, with
intent to defraud the United States, imports or brings into the United States
marihuana contrary to law, or smuggles or clandestinely introduces into the
United States marihuana which should have been invoiced, or receives, con-
ceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment,
or sale of such marihuana after being imported or brought in, knowing the
same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to
law, or whoever conspires to do any of the foregoing acts, shall be im-
prisoned not less than five or more than twenty years and, in addition,
may be fined not more than $20,000.
426 U.S.C. § 4744(a)(1) (1964) provides:
(a) Persons in general.
It shall be unlawful for any person who is a transferee required to pay
the transfer tax imposed by section 4741 (a) - (1) to acquire or otherwise
obtain any marihuana without having paid such tax, or (2) to transport or
conceal, or in any manner facilitate the transportation or concealment of,
any marihuana so acquired or obtained.
5 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964).
6395 U.S. at 33-36.
7 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (1964).
8 395 U.S. at 18.
9Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court in Leary. Justice Black concurred
specially as to the due process issue and Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart
concurred with reservation as to the issue of self-incrimination.
Chief Justice Warren felt himself bound by his dissents in Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 '(1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes
COMMENT
I. DUE PROCESS AND PRESUMPTION
Due process, a bastion of protection against aribitrary use of
power by the sovereign, is a concept that has been with us since the
Magna Charta.10 Though the concept has broadened, its meaning
continues to be elusive - best understood within a specific context.
Fundamental to the concept of due process is the presumptive in-
nocence of an accused until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, with the burden of establishing guilt resting upon the prosecu-
tion. 1 Theoretically then, the prosecution must prove all elements of
a crime. 2 However, Congress often includes presumptions within a
statute by which various elements of a crime are inferred from a
central fact and by so doing lessens the prosecution's burden of
proof.'" Congress creates these presumptions for a number of reasons:
(1) they may save time by focusing the courts attention on a central
issue; (2) they may shift the burden of proof to the party with
superior access to the facts; (3) they are procedurally more con-
venient; or (4) because of social or economic policies.' 4 The effect
v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). In Grosso, the Chief Justice stated that "by its
sweeping declaration that the congressional scheme for enforcing and collecting the
taxes imposed on wagers and gamblers is unconstitutional, the Court has stripped
from Congress the power to make its taxing scheme effective." Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62, 77 (1968).
Justice Stewart expressed the hope that some day the Court would reexamine
the whole line of cases which has broadened the original conception of self-incrimina-
tion. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 54 (1969).
10 "The Crown or its ministers may not punish, imprison, or coerce the subject in an
arbitrary manner." MAGNA CHARTA 1215 art. 39, from 7 HALSBURY'S LAW OF
ENGLAND § 483 (3d ed. 1954).
11 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524 (1958) ; United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349, 363 (1950) ; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910) ; Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895) ; Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 118 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968) ; Government of the Virgin Islands v. Torres, 161
F. Supp. 699, 700 (D.C.V.I. 1958).
12Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273-76 (1952) ; Christoffel v. United
States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949) ; Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 118-20 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 100 (1968); Pauldino v. United States, 379 F.2d 170, 172
(10th Cir. 1967) ; Thurmond v. United States, 377 F.2d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 1967);
People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 439 P.2d 741, 747-50 (Colo. 1968).
13 A presumption has been defined as follows: "A presumption is an assumption of fact
resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." UNIFORM RULES
OF EVIDENCE rule 13 (1965). Extensive literature has developed concerning the
nature and effect of presumptions: C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 307-18
(1954); E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 31-44 (1963); J. THAYER,
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 313-52
1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2490-93 (3d ed. 1940); Brosman, The Statu-
tory Presumptions, 5 TUL. L. REV. 17, 178 (1930); Morgan, How to Approach
Burden of Proof and Presumptions, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 34 '(1953) ; Comment,
1964 DUKE L. J. 867; Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1955).
4 Defendants of presumptions have gone to great lengths to provide rationale for the
existence of these policies. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 309 (1954);
E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 32-33 (1963). But see Chamberlain,
Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287 (1928).
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of a presumption may be to force a party to come forth and give
evidence or it may shift the burden of persuasion. 5
The power of legislatures to create presumptions has long been
recognized by the courts and is limited only by the dictates of the
Constitution."6 Consequently, a number of lines of attack on the con-
stitutionality of presumptions has developed, notably in the areas of
equal protection,' 7 trial by jury,18 self-incrimination,' 9 and due process
of law.2°
15 This is a simplification of the basic effects of a presumption. Much discussion and
debate has dealt with this issue, particularly regarding whether or not a presumption
continues to have evidentiary effect once evidence as to the issue has been presented.
Thayer and Wigmore have taken the position that once evidence comes out regarding
the validity of the issue, the presumption drops out of the case and only has a pro-
cedural effect. See Laughlin, In Defense of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52
MICH. L. REv. 195 (1953). This view was adopted by the American Law Institute
in its MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704(2) (1942). Other authorities feel that
a presumption continues to have evidentiary effect even after some evidence to con-
tradict the presumption has been brought forth. Morgan postulates eight gradients of
effect that a presumption may take. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
34-37 (1962).
'6 See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) ; United States ex rel. Shott v. Tehan,
365 F.2d 191 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1966) ; Shaw v. United States,
357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966). See generally Brosman, The Statutory Presumption,
5 TUL. L. REv. 17, 178 (1930); Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the
District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287 (1928) ; Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-Their
Constitutionality and Legal Effect, 10 TEX. L. REV. 34 (1932).
17 Presumptions cannot discriminate against a particular industry-McFarland v. Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911)-or race-Cockrill v. People, 268 U.S. 258 '(1925). It has been
established that although legislatures have a great deal of freedom in the making of
presumptions, "(Ilt is not within the province of a legislature to declare an indi-
vidual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
523-24 (1958) (emphasis added). See also McFarland v. American Sugar Refining
Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968).
18 justice Black feels that presumptions can unconstitutionally deny a defendant trial
by jury in that "it flaunts the constitutional power of courts and juries for Congress
to tell them what shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction.' "
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 77 (1965) (dissenting opinion). See also
People v. Lyon, 27 Hun 180 (N.Y. 1882); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378
(1856); State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453, 80 A. 12 (1911) ; State v. Beswick, 13 R.I. 211
(1883); Francis v. Baker, 11 R.I. 103 (1875) ; Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283
(1860). Contra, see generally Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. 1010.61 Acres of Land,
146 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1944).
19 Justice Black has said that: "The undoubted practical effect of letting guilt rest on
unexplained presence alone is to force a defendant to come forward and testify ....
The compulsion here is of course more subtle and less cruel physically than com-
pulsion by torture, but it is nonetheless compulsion and it is nonetheless effective."
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
The issue of whether presumptions create self-incrimination has been raised
before the courts a number of times unsuccessfully. See Yee Hem v. United States,
268 U.S. 178 (1925); United States v. Forgett, 349 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1955);
Ng Choy Fong v. United States, 245 F. 305 (9th Cir. 1917) ; People ex rel. Woronoff
v. Mallon, 166 App. Div. 840, 150 N.Y. Supp. 705 (1914), aft'd, 222 N.Y. 456,
119 N.E. 102 (1918); State v. Humphrey, 42 S.D. 512, 176 N.W. 39 (1920).
20 The due process requirements have followed two fundamental paths: (1) the necessity
of a rational connection between the fact presumed and the fact proved-see Leary
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ; United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) ;
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) ; Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943)-and; (2) the unfairness of placing the burden of proof on the defendant
as to a particular issue. "[T]he burden of going forward with the evidence at some
stage of a criminal trial may be placed on the defendant, but only after the State has
Iproved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has
been proved with excuse or explanation .... " Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524
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The most successful ground of attack on legislative presumptions
has probably been that of due process where a "rational connection"
between the established facts and the facts presumed is required.2
Although not the first Supreme Court decision to apply this test,
Tot v. United States clearly established the "rational connection" test
as the controlling rule." In Tot, the Court invalidated section 902 (f)
of the Federal Firearms Act, which made it a presumption that a
firearm was unlawfully transported from the fact that a felon or
fugitive had a firearm in his possession.23 The court said:
A statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed
.... [W]here the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable
relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not
(1958), quoting from Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934). See also
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89
'(1933); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925); Shaw v. United States,
357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
It was once held that the burden of proof could be shifted so long as it didn't
subject "the accused to hardship or oppression." Morrison v. California, 291 U.S.
82, 89 (1933). However, it seems it would be impossible to find a criminal case
where the shift in the burden of proof would not work to the disadvantage of the
accused. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
21See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969) ; see also United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Mc-
Farland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Barrett v. United
States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Garcia v. United States, 250 F.2d 930 (10th
Cir. 1957) ; Minski v. United States, 131 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1943) ; United States
v. Platt, 31 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Tex. 1940) ; United States ex rel. Murphy v. Warden
of Clinton Prison, 29 F. Supp. 486 (N.D.N.Y. 1939), affd, 108 F.2d 861 (2d Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 661, (1940), rehearing denied, 309 U.S. 696 (1940).
22 319 U.S. 463 (1943). There are a number of very early cases which applied the
rational connection test. E.g., Robertson v. People, 20 Colo. 279, 38 P. 326 (1894);
Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S.E. 170 (1928), reversed on other grounds, 279
U.S. 1 (1929) ; State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N.E. 949 (1896) ; People v. Cannon,
139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893). Later, rational connection was considered as an
optional test applied in conjunction with other tests. See Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82 (1934) ; Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928) (dissenting opinion);
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
One such test, the comparative convenience, or balance of convenience test,
determined whether or not it would be more convenient for the defendant to produce
the evidence. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934) ; Yee Hem v. United
States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925). Although never altogether abandoned, the comparative
convenience test was later relegated to a mere "corollary'' test. Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
Similarly, the Court once considered whether or not the legislature might have
considered the presumed act to be a crime. See Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
But see United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 144 (1965) ; Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463 (1943).
2Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), noted in 56 HARv. L. REV. 1324 (1943);
17 S. CAL. L. REV. 48 (1943). The Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1964)
provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or [who) is a
fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession
of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evi-
dence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or
received ... by such person in violation of this chapter.
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competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the
procedure of courts.
2 4
Some courts have applied the rational connection test with great
exactitude, 5 others merely using it in a broad, rhetorical context.26
Furthermore, the rule has been subject to criticism because of its lack
of clarity (e.g., who makes the rational connection - judges, juries,
mankind, or possibly some other independent standard?) .27 Also, a
confusing aspect, but essential to the question, is how strong an
inference is necessary to sustain the presumption as constitutional -
a mere inference, a preponderance of evidence, a substantial assur-
ance, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
By considering the facts and language of recent Supreme Court
decisions one finds clues as to what the test means today. In United
States v. Gainey,- the Court upheld a presumption that one who was
found in the presence of a still was "carrying on" the business of
illegal distillation.29 Although it is possible to be in the vicinity of
illegal conduct without being involved, the Court felt the inference
was permissible because: (1) the statute is broadly worded in that it
encompasses a large class of persons who are involved or connected
with the illegal activities; 30 and (2) "strangers to the illegal business
rarely penetrate the curtain of secrecy.' '-3
24 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943). Cf., Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965). It appears that there are two tests implicit within this
rule; (1) there must be a rational connection, and (2) the inference must not be
strained. The courts, however, have put the emphasis on the first and more stringent
portion of the rule. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 '(1969) ; United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) ; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
25 See United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Torres, 161 F. Supp. 699 (D.C.V.I. 1958).
2 6 See People v. Scott, 24 Cal. 2d 774, 151 P.2d 517 (1944); State v. Grinnett, 33
Idaho 203, 193 P. 380 (1920) ; State v. Spiller, 146 Wash. 180, 262 P. 128 (1927) ;
Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REV. 17, 178 (1930); Note, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1955).
27 See Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1955). The test has been faulted because it is
called a rational connection test whereas it is really an inferential test. id.
2 380 U.S. 63 (1965), noted in 51 A.B.A.J. 482 (1965); 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
1137 (1965); 79 HARv. L. REV. 159 (1965); 27 MONT. L. REv. 216 (1966).
Gainey was apprehended late at night as he approached the still, flashlight in hand.
He was surprised by revenue agents and attempted to flee, but was caught after a
short chase.
29Id. at 67. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(2) (1964) provides:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (4) the defendant
is shown to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, the
business of a distiller or rectifier was so engaged in or carried on, such
presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction
of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury).
30 26 U.S.C. § 5601'(a) (4) provides: "Any person who.., carries on the business of
a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as required by law... shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, for each such
offense."
3' 380 U.S. at 67-68 (1965). The Court also noted that the circuit courts had differed
as to the significance of one's presence at a still and thus the question was proper
for legislative determination. Id. at 67. See also Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160
(1947) ; United States v. Freeman, 286 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1961).
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In United States v. Romano,32 a similar case involving a still,
decided a few months after Gainey, the Court came to a different
conclusion. The Court considered the question of whether possession,
custody, or control can be inferred from mere presence at the site of
an illegal still, and concluded that -[p]resence is relevant and admis-
sible evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some show-
ing of the defendant's function at the still, [such presence] is too
tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt ..... " The Court,
in Romano, distinguished Gainey on the basis that section 5601
(a) (1), is narrow in scope, addressing itself to "only one of the
various aspects of the total undertaking," 4 whereas Gainey in-
volved a violation of section 5601 (a) (4), a "sweeping prohibition
of carrying on a distillation business. ' 1 5 That is, the prohibition
against "carrying on" the business is aimed at a broad category of
persons (e.g., those in supply, delivery, or operational activities as
well as those having possession and/or control), while the statute
enjoining "possession, custody or control" affects a mere subclass of
the former. 6 It is more probable that one who is present at a still is
"carrying on" the business because of the large number of persons in
this category. Thus, it appears, the Court will scrutinize carefully the
language of the applicable statute with a view toward determining
the breadth of its application, particularily where the offense is defined
narrowly and the presumption seems far afield.
3 382 U.S. 136 (1965), noted in 52 A.B.A.J. 82 (1966), and 8 WM. & MARY L. REV.
164 (1966). Romano was apprehended when federal authorities, armed with a
search warrant, surprised the defendant and found him standing a few feet from an
operating still.
33 382 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added). A number of circuit courts had already concluded
that something more than presence at a still was necessary to prove possession. See
Pugliese v. United States, 343 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1965) ; McFarland v. United States,
273 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Vick v. United States, 216 F. 2d 228 (5th Cir. 1954)
Graceffo v. United States, 46 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1931).
34 United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 141 (1965).
35 1d. at 140. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a) (1) (1964) provides that: "Any person who...
[hias in his possession or custody, or under his control, any still or distilling appa-
ratus set up which is not registered, as required by section 5179 (a) ... shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, for each
such offense."
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(4) (1964) supra note 30.
Judicial determination of whether a statute is broad or narrow in effect some-
times seems like speculation into the mysteries of the unknown, though it seems that
more people would fit into the category of carrying on the business than would fit
into the categories of possession, custody, or control. For one such speculation see
Vukich v. United States, 28 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1928).
3 Both categories are quite broad in light of the fact that accessories come within the
statute and are treated as principals. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) provides that:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punish-
able as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly per-
formed by him or another would be an offense against the United States,
is punishable as a principal.
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Although the Court's distinction based on breadth of the ap-
plicable statute has logical validity, an alternative interpretation
is that the Court is today applying the test in a more critical fash-
ion.37 The very fact that it drew such a fine distinction may be an
indication that the Court has begun to move toward a more strict
application of the Tot rule.
Few courts have tried to define how strong a connection is
necessary to sustain a presumption, but it appears that they are
making an effort in this direction. A recent district court decision did
try to define this threshold question and required a surprisingly
strong nexus. 8 The court felt that a presumption should in no way
lighten the burden of proof and therefore must be abandoned if the
relationship cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.39
The most recent case in the series applying the Tot rule, Leary v.
United States,4" strikes down a presumption whereby all the elements
of knowingly transporting marihuana are inferred from its posses-
sion.41 The Court noted that the validity of a presumption is not a
"matter within specialized judicial competence" and "'significant
weight should be accorded the capacity of Congress to amass the
stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it.' "42 However,
the Court did consider a vast amount of empirical data in order to
negate the presumption and indicated that if Congress did not limit
presumptions to the "circumstances of life as we know them," the
Court would.43 It concluded that the presumption was "' highly
empirical,' ,,44 and must be based on a consideration of all the avail-
able and pertinent facts. Thus, when ascertaining the constitutionality
of a presumption the Court will keep three considerations in
mind: the particular wording of the statute, the empirical bases of
37 See 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 164 (1966).
38 United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
39 Id.; but see Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied;
Romero v. United States, 357 U.S. 931 (1958) ; State v. Knudsen, 3 Conn. Cir. 458,
217 A.2d 236 (1965).
40 395 U.S. 6 '(1969).
41 The elements which are presumed from possession are that: (1) the marihuana was
smuggled; (2) the defendant knew it was smuggled; and (3) it was smuggled with
intent to defraud the United States. Id. at 37. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964) provides
in part that: "Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defendant
is shown to have or to have had the marihuana in his possession, such possession
shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant
explains his possession to the satisfaction of the jury."
42 395 U.S. at 38, quoting from United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
4 Id. at 34, quoting from Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1943) ; cf. United
States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) ; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63
(1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
44 395 U.S. at 38; cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).
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the inferences, and the determinations of Congress, if any, with
respect to these bases.
In Leary, the Court indicated that the inference must necessarily
be quite strong, saying "unless it can at least be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from
the proven fact on which it is made to depend," the statutory presump-
tion will be deemed unconstitutional. 45 An analysis of the Leary
decision indicates just how strong the connection between the actual
facts and the presumption must be. The presumption of knowledge
that the marihuana was of foreign origin was found invalid even
though: (1) "most domestically consumed marihuana is still of
foreign origin" -possibly as much as 90 percent;46 and (2) there
are five possible ways by which the consumer may become aware of
the source. He may: (a) be aware of the high percentage of mari-
huana which is smuggled and deduce that his was illegally imported;
(b) have smuggled the marihuana himself; (c) have specified that
he wanted foreign marihuana when he bought it; (d) be able to
tell from the appearance, packaging, or taste of the marihuana; or
(e) know by indirect means that his supplier smuggled it.4" These
possibilities could obviously lead one to the presumption that the
user knew the source of the marihuana. But in applying the test,
the Court refused to uphold this presumption and held that there
must be "substantial assurance" of a rational connection.48
It appears that the Court has adopted a strict application of the
Tot rule. A number of statutes may therefore be in jeopardy as a
result of the Court's stringent application of the test, specifically
those statutes concerning smuggled goods, " kidnapping, 50 obscene
45 395 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added). The Court uses the phrase "substantial assurances"
for the first time in a case of this nature and seems to put a good deal of emphasis
on it in that the term appears in the opinion at least three times. To determine how
strong an inference must be in order to constitute a rational connection is necessarily
difficult. However, one court has stated that a presumption should in no way lighten
the burden of proof and therefore must be abandoned if not able to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
But see Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Romero v.
United States, 357 U.S. 931 (1958) ; State v. Knudsen, 3 Conn. Cir. 458, 217 A.2d
236 (1965), appeal granted 222 A.2d 810 (1966).
46 395 U.S. at 41. Ninety percent of all marihuana seized is said to be smuggled from
Mexico, but this may in part reflect the positioning and activities of the federal
authorities. Id. See also S. REp. No. 1997, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 13 (1956);
H.R. REP. No. 2388, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956); BUREAU OF NARCOTICS,
REPORT ON THE TRAFFIC IN OPIUM AND OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS 67 (1965).
47 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
48Id. at 36.
49 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1964) provides that smuggling is presumed from possession of
smuggled goods.
50 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964) provides that transportation in interstate commerce is pre-
sumed from a victim's absence for 24 hours.
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publications,51 narcotics,5 2 heroin," opium,5 4 stills,5 and firearms.5"
It also appears from the holding of the Court that, in the future,
statutory presumptions will be subject to attack wherever there is a
question as to the empirical validity of the inference. 7
II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The fifth amendment provides that; "No person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . 8
This privilege has broadened since its inception, and has always
been a "powerful symbol of individual liberty."5" The protection
from self-incrimination has no clear-cut standards implicit within it
51 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964) provides that transportation of obscene publications for
sale or distribution is presumed from possession of any five such publications.
52 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) provides that smuggling of a narcotic into the United States
is presumed from its possession. 26 U.S.C. § 4724(c) (1964) provides that failure
to register and pay special tax is presumed from narcotics possession. 26 U.S.C.
§ 4755(a)(2) (1964) provides that production of illegal marihuana is presumed
from its presence on the land.
5 21 U.S.C. § 176(b) (1964) provides that illegal importation of heroin is presumed
from its possession.
5 21 U.S.C. § 181 (1964) provides that illegal importation of opium is presumed from
its possession.
5526 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(3) (1964) provides that unlawful production of distilled
spirits is presumed from one's presence at the place where mash, wort, or wash is
being fermented. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(4) (1964) provides that unlawful produc-
tion of distilled spirits is presumed from one's presence at the site of a still.
56 26 U.S.C. § 5851(1) (1964) provides that unlawful receipt of firearms in violation
of interstate commerce is presumed from their possession.
57 In Leary, the Court went to great lengths to examine the probability of the validity
of the presumption in light of the habits of marihuana users and indicated that this
is a proper function of the Court, especially where the legislature's fact finding was
not conclusive. 395 U.S. at 39. 18 U.S.C. § 837(c) (1964) is an example of how
statutes could be written and probably withstand the test of constitutionality. It
provides that:
The possession of an explosive in such a manner as to evince an intent
to use,... damage or destroy any building... creates rebutable presump-
tions that the explosive was transported in interstate or foreign commerce
... provided, however, that no person may be convicted under this section
unless there is evidence independent of the presumption that this section
has been violated.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The courts have construed the fifth amendment liberally.
See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) ; Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479 (1951) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; Gilbert v. United
States, 163 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1947). It has been held that this constitutional
guarantee includes a freedom from prejudicial remarks about the defendant's silence.
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, petition for rehearing denied, 381 U.S. 957
(1965); De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). The privilege
is a personal right and does not apply to papers of a public nature. Thus, with
exceptions such as required records, tax forms, licenses, and other records required
under an appropriate regulation the immunity does not extend to all areas. See
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) ; United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S.
259 (1927) ; Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 812 (1947). In defining an appropriate regulation, the required records doc-
trine has been limited to noncriminal and regulatory areas rather than areas permeated
with criminal statutes. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). Cf. Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) ; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
5 Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 18 U. Cii. L. REv. 687 (1951). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
VOL. 46
1969 COMMENT
and "yields to no convenient formula." 60 Nevertheless, the courts
have specified a number of guidelines. In order to invoke the
privilege, the testimony in question must be compelled by some
coercive force, legal or factual.6" Both oral and written testimony are
treated equally; 2 however, the privilege is limited to "testimonial"
or "communicative" evidence (diaries, letters, other written com-
munications, or statements) rather than "real" and "physical" evi-
dence (blood tests, handwriting and voice tests, and a large number
of other police investigatory techniques)."s The privilege has been
held to apply to any testimony which would furnish "a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute .... 6 4 However, there are
limitations placed upon the privilege. For example, until recently
a person's communications with the government (e.g., registra-
tion or income and excise tax forms) were outside the privilege and
6 0 McKay, Self-incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 194; see
generally 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Kalven,
Invoking the Fifth Amendment: Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL.
ATM. ScI. 181 (1953) ; Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda v. Arizona Dissent;
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test,
65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966); Morgan, The Privilege against Self-incrimination,
34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949) ; Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of
the Privilege Against Self-incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935);
Symposium, Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 169 (1966);
Note, 45 DENVER L.J. 427 (1968).
61 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) ; United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427
(2d Cir. 1967). Where the defendant was a juvenile, the court found psychological
domination by the authorities sufficient to satisfy the necessity of compulsion, indi-
cating that youths must be treated with even greater care. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
62 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); People ex rel.
Ferguson v. Reardon, 197 N.Y. 236, 90 N.E. 829 (1910).
63 This distinction has recently been the subject of a large amount of litigation particu-
larly as to handwritten samples which have been deemed to be physical and real
evidence and thus not within the privilege. Granza v. United States, 381 F.2d 190
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 939 (1967) ; Weaver v. United States, 379
F.2d 799 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967) ; United States v. Serad,
367 F.2d 347 '(2d Cir. 1966), vacated, 390 U.S. 1034 (1968); Shelton v. United
States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 892 (1953), motion
denied, 349 U.S. 943 (1955). But see Lewis v. United States, 382 F.2d 817 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967) ; United States v. Green, 282 F. Supp. 373
(S.D. Ind. 1968). Some types of evidence, considered to be real and physical, is
outside the scope of this privilege, e.g..- fingerprints-Pearson v. United States, 389
F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1968) ; United States ex rel. O'Halloran v. Rundle, 384 F.2d 997
(3d Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio
1968); stand and give name-Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Cowans v.
Warden Md. Penitentiary, 276 F. Supp. 696 (D. Md. 1967); blood samples-
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Brent v. White, 276 F. Supp. 386
(E.D. La. 1967); psychological examination-United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d
719 (4th Cir. 1968); Early v. Tinsley, 286 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 830 (1961), rehearing denied. 365 U.S. 890 '(1961); police line up-
United States v. Hutto, 393 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1968); Schmidt v. United States,
380 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 908 (1968) ; Gilbert v. United
States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967) ; voice
identification-Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968); Wise v. United States,
383 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 964 (1968).
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 159, 161 (1950) ; United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968). See also
United States v. Klehman, 397 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 987
(1969).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
thus had to be filed regardless of their nature.6" However, Leary is
the fourth in a series of recent decisions wherein the privilege has
been extended to include excise tax registrations if such disclosures
are likely to lead to arrest or conviction.66
In Leary, the Court found "real and appreciable risk of self-
incrimination"67 based on the fact that an individual's coming for-
ward and registering makes him highly suspect and increases the
possibility of investigation."' Also, the information required was "in
an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of
the form's questions in context might involve the petitioners in the
admission of a crucial element of a crime."' 9 Not only does the Sec-
retary of the Treasury become aware of the individual's activities,
but these activities become a matter of public record as well."°
In light of the fact that 48 states have statutes restricting the
distribution and use of marihuana, 71 Justice Black has described the
65 See United States v. Forgett, 349 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded,
390 U.S. 203 (1968) (bringing the case in alignment with the Haynes decision);
United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1957) ; cf. Myres v. United
States, 174 F.2d 329 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 849 (1949). It was felt that
the government needed information to carry on its day to day business and that it
must be able to compel disclosure so that the information would be received in a
timely manner. The government's argument breaks down when a tax is a tax only
on its face, collecting only negligible revenue, but is in fact a regulatory statute.
See generally Mansfield, The Albertson case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against
Self-incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv.
103; McKay, Self-incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193.
66 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) ; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). A number of other decisions
have also considered this question and reached similar results. See United States v.
Covington, 395 U.S. 57 (1969) ; United States v. Walden, No. 12,849 (4th Cir.,
June 10, 1969) ; United States v. Freeman, 412 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Lewis
v. United States, 408 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir. 1969); Whaley v. United States, 394
F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1968), where the privilege, though recognized, was found to be
waived because of lack of proper assertion.
67 395 U.S. at 16. In Marchetti the court said: "The central standard for the privilege's
application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and
not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
See also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591 (1896).
68 395 U.S. at 18. See generally Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the
Privilege against Self-incrimination and the Government's need for Information,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103; McKee, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal Gambling
Tax, 5 DUKE B.J. 86 (1956).
69 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965); see also
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ; Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,
47 (1968) ; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 64 (1968).
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 4773 provides that:
[Sltatements or returns . .. shall be open to inspection by officers and
employees of the Treasury Department duly authorized for that purpose,
and such officials of any State or Territory, or of any organized munici-
pality therein.., as shall be charged with the enforcement of any law or
municipal ordinance regulating the production of marihuana or regulating
the sale, prescribing, dispensing, dealing in, or distribution of narcotic
drugs or marihuana.
71 These states have enacted a prohibition similar to the provisions of the UNIFORM
NARcOTIc DRUG AcT. See 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 409-10 (1966). Section 2 of
this act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess ... any narcotic
drug, except as authorized in this act." Section 1(14) includes "cannabis" in the
category of "narcotic drugs."
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effect of federal registration statutes as a "squeezing device contrived
to put a man in federal prison if he refuses to confess himself into a
state prison . ".. ,72
Presuming that tax measures are valid, 73 the courts have tradi-
tionally deferred to Congressional power; "[s]o long as Congress acts
in pursuance of its constitutional power, the judiciary lacks authority
to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of
that power. ' 74 This freedom gives Congress a great deal of power
because "[elvery tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it
imposes an economic impediment on the activity taxed as compared
with others not taxed. ' '7 However, the Supreme Court has recently
stated: "This Court must give deference to Congress' taxing powers,
and to measures reasonably incidental to their exercise; but we are no
less obliged to heed the limitations placed upon those powers by the
Constitution's other commands. ' "7 Thus, the freedom from self-
incrimination will provide a complete defense to a registration re-
quirement unless there is no substantial risk of self-incrimination,
77
the plea is untimely, 78 or the privilege has been waived.
79
The successful invocation of this privilege in a number of taxa-
tion areas (e.g., the excise taxes on gambling, firearms, and mari-
huana) indicates that the Court has considered the question carefully
and even in light of the changing complexion of the Court, the ques-
72 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1953) (dissenting opinion). Justice
Black's dissent became the accepted view when Kahriger was overruled by Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
3 See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S.
486 (1904) ; Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899).
74 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 132 (1959). Cf. United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42 (1950); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 '(1937); Costellano
v. United States, 350 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 949 (1966).
7 5 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937). The use of taxing measures
to regulate behavior is frequently used. This device has generally been held to be
constitutional. -[A) tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, dis-
courages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed." United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950). See also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
76 Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968). See also United States v. Covington,
395 U.S. 57 (1969) ; Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ; Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
7 Risk of incrimination is an absolute necessity to the application of this privilege and
where the activity involved is not illegal '(i.e., liquor manufacture and sales) there
is no defense available to a charge of failure to register and pay the tax. See Anderson
v. United States, 403 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Shoffeitt v. United States, 403 F.2d
991 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1094 (1969) ; Brown v. United States,
401 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 962 (1969).
78 United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57 (1969). The Court has held that "A plea
on motion to dismiss the indictment is plainly timely." Id. at 60.
S9 See 18 U.S.C.A. rule 12(b) (3) (1969). A defendant may waive the privilege against
self-incrimination; this waiver must be made voluntarily, intelligently, and with full
knowledge of his rights. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; United States v. Neilsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.
1968).
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tion will continue to be answered in a like manner.8 0 By invalidating
the registration requirement under the Marihuana Tax Act, the
Court has cast doubt on the validity of a number of other statutes.8'
Similarly, the Court's willingness to invalidate a tax act puts Congress
on notice that the Court will not allow Congress to do indirectly,
through taxation, what it could not do directly. 2 Moreover, this
decision seems to signal at least a temporary return to an earlier posi-
tion of the Court where tax measures were scrutinized carefully in
order to determine if they were a proper exercise of the tax power.83
The Leary decision is well founded in reason and justice. There
appears to be no reason to allow Congress to circumvent the dictates
of the Constitution by use of its taxing power. Unquestionably, the
freedom from self-incrimination is so fundamental to our values that
the court should and will go to great lengths to protect this and all
other rights.
Vance E. Halvorson
80 Only two justices of the Court, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart, have ex-
pressed reservations as to the self-incrimination issue, thus it appears that a strong
majority of the court approves of the discussion and will be of like mind in the future.
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
81 In the past, a number of registration requirements have been challenged, although on
the whole unsuccessfully, e.g.: United States v. Toussie, 280 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y.
1967) ; Foreign Agents Registration Act-22 U.S.C. § 612 (1958), see United States
v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951) ; distilleries-26 U.S.C.
§§ 5173, 5179, 5222, 5801 (1964), see United States v. Young, 284 F. Supp. 1008
(E.D. Tenn. 1968); United States v. McGee, 282 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
82 When the Marihuana Tax Act was passed, Congress was fully aware of the pub-
licity a user would receive from registration yet it did not really consider the impli-
cation in light of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Two objectives have dictated the form of H.R. 6906, first, the develop-
ment of a plan of taxation which will raise revenue and at the same time
render extremely difficult the acquisition of marihuana by persons who
desire it for illicit use, and second the development of an adequate means
of publicizing dealings in marihuana in order to tax and control the tax
effectively.
H.R. REP. No. 792, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). See also S. REP. No. 900 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., 103 (1937). The Court does not challenge Congress' powers of
taxation, but it demands that the methods used be "entirely consistent with constiti-
tional limitations .... " Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968).
8 See Child Labor Tax Case, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922);
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 '(1819). McCulloch was the first
case in which the Court exercised power of judicial review over congressional legisla-
tion and since that case was decided, the Court has broadly expanded the use of
that power.
